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After the Northwest Passage is opened up it will become a new 
“axial sea route between Atlantic and Pacific,” and the sea route 
between Europe, Asia, and North America will be shortened by 
5,200 to 7,000 nautical miles. Whoever controls the Arctic sea 
route will control the world economy and a new internationally 
strategic corridor. 
                                                                                       LI ZHENFU
The Chinese are increasingly interested in the effects of global climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice cap, especially as they pertain to emergent sea routes, 
natural resources, and geopolitical advantage.1 China seems to see the overall effect of 
Arctic climate change as more of a beckoning economic opportunity than a looming 
environmental crisis. Even though it is not an Arctic country, China wants to be among 
the first states to exploit the region’s natural resource wealth and to ply ships through its 
sea routes, especially the Northwest Passage. 
The Arctic is currently quite topical in China, and articles on China’s newfound interest 
in Arctic affairs now appear with some frequency in major academic journals, as well as 
in the popular media. There is currently something of a cacophony of Chinese voices on 
Arctic affairs, and this is because Chinese Arctic policy has not been fully formulated or 
promulgated.2 There does, however, seem to be a current consensus within Arctic policy 
debate, discussion, and deliberation in China, and that is that the Arctic belongs to all 
humankind and not to any one country or group of countries. But herein is a quandary 
for China, which has a long and assertive record of insisting on sovereign state rights as 
the paramount principle of international relations. As the Finnish scholar Linda Jakob-
son of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has trenchantly pointed out, 
China’s insistence that respect for state sovereignty be a guiding principle of international 
relations makes it difficult for China to question the Arctic states’ sovereignty [and sover-
eign] rights [and jurisdiction]. There is some irony in the statements by Chinese officials 
calling on the Arctic states to consider the interests of mankind so that all states can share 
in the Arctic. These statements appear to be contrary to China’s long-standing principles 
of respect for sovereignty and the internal affairs of other states.3
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Even though China is currently climbing the Arctic learning curve, it seems reluctant to 
acknowledge that it being a non-Arctic country, its influence in the Arctic and in Arctic 
affairs might be somewhat limited. This hesitance arises, however, not from pride or 
haughtiness but from concern over the multivalent implications of such an acknowl-
edgement: China does not want to lose any ground in its campaign to become a major 
player in the world in general, and increasingly for Beijing that means being a player in 
the Arctic. China wants, as the term in Chinese goes, to “insert its hands” (chashou) into 
Arctic affairs but finds it inconvenient to indicate this directly, because that would be 
infelicitous diplomatically. So instead, China engages in unctuous and circumlocutory 
diplomatic language about respecting the sovereignty of Arctic countries, hoping that 
the Arctic countries can resolve their differences quickly and anticipating that Arctic 
issues can ultimately be worked out through negotiation to the satisfaction of both the 
Arctic and international communities. But the gentlemanly bows and matronly curtsies 
and bouquets of Chinese diplomatic gesturing should not be confused for acquiescence 
or lack of resolve on China’s part. Despite its status as a non-Arctic country, China seems 
bound and determined to have a voice, perhaps even a say-so, in Arctic affairs. 
China today is quite aware of the U.S. Geological Survey’s estimates that “25% of the 
world’s undiscovered hydrocarbon resources are found there, along with 9% of the 
world’s coal and other economically critical minerals.”4 Whether or not it will own up 
to it in so many words, China nurses an enormous sense of entitlement to the natural 
resource wealth of the Arctic, because it is a major emerging world power and a perma-
nent member of the United Nations Security Council. This was expressed by Chinese 
rear admiral Yin Zhuo in March 2010: “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the 
world, as no nation has sovereignty over it. . . . China must plan an indispensable role in 
Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.”5
The Chinese nightmare scenario for the Arctic is that the European and North American 
Arctic powers will more or less gang up and “carve up the Arctic melon” and its natu-
ral resources among themselves, to the exclusion of everyone else. At least one Chinese 
academic has raised alarmist concerns about Russia’s dropping of a titanium capsule 
containing a Russian flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in late 2007, about Russia’s 
“dream of extending its continental shelf,” and about its putative suggestion of an alli-
ance among the eight Arctic states, known as the A8:* 
Things that happen in the Arctic and Antarctic involve China’s rights and interests. During 
this process we should guard against some individual states casting China aside and pri-
vately consulting [among themselves] about establishing a regional multilateral treaty sys-
tem, thereby harming China’s polar rights and interests. This concern is not unreasonable 
* The “A8” are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. The 
“A5,” mentioned below, are the five Arctic littoral states: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia, 
and the United States. 
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because Russian scholars have been clamoring for the establishment of an “Eight-State 
Polar Region Alliance” [Jidi baguo lianmeng].6
The use of the term “Eight-State Polar Region Alliance” here for a possible alliance 
among the A8 states is highly charged, emotively, because it directly echoes the infamous 
military conduct of the “Eight-State Allied Forces” (Baguo Lianjun) that entered and 
sacked Beijing in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion in the late summer and autumn 
of 1900.7 For many Chinese such a multilateral treaty system among Arctic powers to the 
exclusion of China would be, at the intuitive and visceral level, somewhat reminiscent of 
the imperialist deprivation and bullying China suffered during its century of humilia-
tion, from the mid-nineteenth through mid-twentieth centuries.
This study considers at some length the discussions and debates on Arctic issues, mainly 
in Chinese-language scholarly journals but also in journalistic and diplomatic Chinese-
language discussion. This study is neither an overview of international Arctic issues and 
disputes nor a speculative piece on China’s geopolitical and strategic intentions in the 
Arctic. It is also not an introduction to China’s recent interest in Arctic affairs, which was 
the topic of Linda Jakobson’s fine and pioneering article published in early 2010.8 It is, 
rather, a report on China’s sometimes-contentious debates and discussions of the issue, 
an account that hopes to convey something of their extent, complexity, and flavor while 
China works out its Arctic policy and prepares for its future position in and regarding 
the Arctic. It also offers some foreign policy recommendations for the United States.
In these Chinese debates and exchanges there is not much direct or substantive con-
sideration of the Arctic interests and policies of the United States. The reasons for this 
seem to defy simple analysis. It is unlikely that China would refrain from extensive 
commentary on Arctic issues simply to avoid worsening any further the already-frayed 
Sino-American relationship. It could well be that China actually does not see much with 
which to disagree in American Arctic policy, at least as presently constituted; the two 
states have common interests in the Arctic, not the least of which is freedom of naviga-
tion through it. At the policy level, the United States is not seeking to challenge China 
in the Arctic. Further, while it is unlikely that China declines to take the United States 
seriously as an Arctic power, China does seem to see Russia and especially Canada as the 
principals in current Arctic issues; certainly the United States does not assert the claims 
to sovereignty over Arctic sea routes that Canada does. Finally, it may also well be that 
the continuing failure of the United States to accede to the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is, to some extent, muffling Washington’s voice in 
international forums on maritime issues in the Arctic and other regions. 
Linda Jakobson speculates that “the notion that China has rights in the Arctic can be 
expected to be repeated in articles by Chinese academics and in comments by Chinese 
officials until it gradually begins to be perceived as an accepted state of affairs.”9 There 
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is, however, disagreement in China over exactly what these rights are or ought to be. 
China’s scholarly discourse on its Arctic interests is not monolithic or uniformly teleo-
logical. While the interrelationships in China of cause and effect between academic and 
public discourse on the one hand and the formulation of state policy on the other are 
usually only translucent, if not opaque, to outsiders, the presence and apparent tolera-
tion of debate and disparity about Arctic affairs does suggest that scholarly publication is 
not always an echo chamber for CPC (Communist Party of China) policy diktat. There 
is genuine debate in China, at least for the present, about some aspects of Arctic policy.
Conflict in or over the Arctic? 
It seems almost obligatory in Chinese articles on the nation’s interests in the Arctic to 
include the introductory observation that the Arctic, hitherto almost universally seen 
as bleak, frigid, and forbidding, is now regarded with the covetous eyes and glowering 
visages of major powers who long to control access to its waters, militarize its islands, 
and secure legal rights to its wealth in oil, natural gas, minerals, and seafood. A prime 
example is an article published in 2010 in the prestigious Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan xuebao 
(Journal of the University of International Relations) by Xu Zhenwei (of Nankai Univer-
sity’s Zhou Enlai School of Government and Management in Tianjin) and Xu Yuanyuan 
(of Qingdao University’s School of Economics in Qingdao, Shandong Province). It 
points out (perhaps unwittingly) that China covets the same Arctic assets that the 
United States, Canada, and Russia do: “What, after all, is so alluring about the ice-in-the-
sky, snow-on-the-earth Arctic that it makes the three great and powerful countries the 
U.S., Canada, and Russia contentious to the point that they don’t know what to do? After 
reading through many materials we have discovered [the reasons]: resources, sea routes, 
and strategic significance. These three resplendent jewels attract covetous stares from the 
three great and powerful countries.”10 
That the Arctic might emerge in the future as the theater for regional and perhaps even 
global conflict is a possibility entertained with some seriousness in China today. An 
article published in 2010 in the influential popular magazine Dangdai haijun (Modern 
Navy) notes that the United States is currently procuring more warm clothing for naval 
personnel and is, in accordance with the U.S. Navy’s Arctic Roadmap, preparing for the 
construction and deployment of an Arctic surface fleet, a project slated for the years 
2011 through 2015.11 A senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army noted in 2008 
that use of force in the Arctic over issues of sovereignty could not be ruled out.12 In an 
article published in 2009, Li Zhenfu, associate professor in the College of Transportation 
Management at Dalian Maritime University in Dalian, Liaoning Province, argues that 
the ultimate resolution of Arctic issues will have direct bearing on world security.13 
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During the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union believed that whoever 
owned the Arctic would control the world, asserts a brief recent article in the popular 
fortnightly magazine Dongbei zhi chuang (Window on the Northeast). The article quotes 
a recent prediction in the Russian tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda (the Communist Youth 
League version of Pravda, still in publication today and the top-selling newspaper in 
Russia) about the likelihood of World War III breaking out in the Arctic: 
The dispute over the Arctic is strategic in nature for all Arctic countries. For Russia, the 
United States, and Canada, what used to be seen as a natural barrier in their backyards 
has suddenly become a wide open, bustling artery, one for which the legal boundaries are 
vague and the characteristics unclear. This presents major issues for the present and future 
wealth and security of these countries. This remote and silent realm of frozen seas and 
snow-capped peaks has suddenly become “hot.” The Arctic Council is no longer a polite 
and genteel academic forum for geography, meteorology, and scientific research. 
With the continual discoveries of new resources beneath the Arctic Ocean, this previously 
neglected land of snow and ice has become a treasure house at which each country gazes 
with the cruel greed of a tiger. Although the land areas of the Arctic are owned by the eight 
countries Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United States, and 
Russia, the strife over Arctic sovereignty has not only not subsided, but has become more 
vehement over time. Russia’s Komsomolskaya Pravda even predicts that “because there are 
serious discrepancies over the division and delimitation of Arctic interests, the World War 
III of the future may well break out in the Arctic.”14
Russia—disparagingly called the “big northern lunk” in 2010 by Chinese academics 
Mei Hong and Wang Zengzhen, of the School of Law and Political Science at the Ocean 
University of China in Qingdao—has taken note of China’s new and aggressive pursuit 
of Arctic interests.15 “Russia will increase naval patrols in the Arctic Ocean to defend 
its interests against nations such as China seeking a share of the area’s mineral wealth,” 
Reuters quoted Russian Navy commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky as saying on 4 
October 2010 in an interview with Itar-Tass. “We are observing the penetration of a host 
of states which . . . are advancing their interests very intensively, in every possible way, 
in particular China,” Vysotsky continued, adding that Russia would “not give up a single 
inch” in the Arctic.16 The next day, however, perhaps in an attempt to provide a counter-
weight to Admiral Vysotsky’s comments, Russia Today reported an authoritative opinion 
that Arctic issues between the two states were not likely lead to conflict:
Evgeny Bazhankov, Vice Chancellor of Research and International Relations at the Russian 
Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy, believes there is not much for Russia to worry 
about in relation to China’s growing role in the region. Like many other countries, it does 
pursue its economic interests in the region, which is sprawling with natural resources. 
However, he told RT, it is unlikely that Moscow and Beijing would ever clash over the 
area. The analyst underlined that the two states are “strategic partners” whose positions on 
many international issues, including at the UN, are the same. Therefore, Russia and China 
would certainly be able to come to an agreement on the Arctic zone question as well.17
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Popular glossy military magazines in China often beat the war drums about the likeli-
hood of conflict breaking out in the Arctic. An article in the November 2010 issue of 
Dangdai haijun is a typical example: 
According to the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” currently in effect, 
the Arctic does not belong to any country. In addition to the five circum-Arctic countries 
Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, many [other] countries have 
proclaimed partial sovereignty over the Arctic. At present there is no Arctic country which 
has clearly proven that its continental shelf extends into the Arctic, and because of this the 
Arctic is regarded as an “international area” and is supervised and managed by the Inter-
national Seabed Authority. Some countries are contending for Arctic sovereignty, and this 
is tantamount to infringing upon the interests of the other countries of the world. In facing 
this real and quite unpredictable “scramble and battle for the Arctic” and the probability of 
some countries dividing up the [Arctic] melon with the aid of geographical advantage and 
military might, if peaceful means cannot produce the anticipated effects, war becomes the 
only method for resolving the issue. Based on this, it is not difficult for us to imagine that 
the probability of the future outbreak of war in the Arctic is very high, and that as soon as 
war breaks out, the United States, Russia, and Canada will be its main principals.18
In Canada, more benign and rational assessments of potential trouble in the Arctic 
usually (but not always) prevail; there may be tension and friction in the Arctic in the 
future, but by and large Canadian commentators on Arctic affairs do not usually see 
conflict as a distinct possibility. The conclusions of Kyle D. Christensen of Canada’s 
National Defence Headquarters are typical: “There exists in China a distinct group of 
academics and officials trying to influence leaders to adopt a much more assertive stance 
in the Arctic than has traditionally been the case. This could ultimately bring China into 
disagreement with circumpolar states in a variety of issue areas, and alter security and 
sovereignty relationships in the circumpolar region.”19
Chinese Scholarly Writing on Arctic Issues 
The Zhongguo Haiyang Daxue xuebao (Journal of the Ocean University of China), of the 
Ocean University of China, has been a prominent outlet for discussion of China’s Arctic 
interests and has recently published a spate of important articles on the subject.20 Most 
of the principals in these discussions and debates are academics, but popular media in 
China and the Chinese government itself are also beginning to comment more on Arctic 
affairs. 
Not all is monolithic or dogmatic in China’s discussion and dissension on Arctic affairs, 
however; there is in fact a fairly wide range of opinions and perspectives. For instance, 
scholarly articles in Chinese typically discuss China’s interests in the Arctic, but there 
seems to be no unanimity of opinion as to exactly what all of these interests are. There 
seems to be something of a consensus in academic articles that China should strive for 
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and preserve its “right to speak up” (huayu quan) about Arctic affairs, but even this is 
disputed, as by two scholars in an important article published in a major journal in 
2010: “We have no way to participate fully, or even participate at all, in Arctic affairs. We 
especially have no right to speak up on the dispute about authority over the territorial 
waters of the Arctic Archipelago.”21 
Nonetheless, the preponderance of scholarly discussion clearly favors the idea that China 
deserves some voice in Arctic affairs and that the sea routes and natural resources of the 
Arctic should be open to the entire world. The mantra that the Arctic and its natural 
resource wealth belong to no one country or group of countries but constitute the com-
mon heritage of all humankind is virtually de rigueur in recent Chinese public commen-
tary on Arctic affairs. There are also indications that China sees itself at the vanguard of 
the rest of humanity and the international community in this regard. 
A Chinese admiral said in early 2010 that since China has 20 percent of the world’s 
population, it should have 20 percent of the Arctic’s resources.22 While this attempt at 
moral reasoning does not likely amount to officially announced Chinese policy, it does 
reflect China’s sense of moral entitlement to access to Arctic sea routes and its anxiety 
that Arctic states might somehow endeavor to block or restrict this access. 
The Chinese do, by and large, recognize Arctic issues mainly as regional ones, but they 
seek to emphasize and enlarge their international dimensions, especially as they pertain 
to natural resources and sea routes. The operative assumption seems to be that increased 
internationalization of Arctic affairs will work more to China’s advantage than does the 
current dispensation. Among prescient Chinese who write on Arctic affairs, however, 
there is concern that the nation might not be up to the task of projecting and promoting 
its Arctic interests in the international arena, since global mechanisms are founded large-
ly upon Western concepts and ideologies with which China is not especially familiar. 
One author in particular, Li Zhenfu, urges his fellow Chinese to familiarize themselves 
with those Western theories and mechanisms to lessen purely moral and ethical reason-
ing pertaining to China’s rights and interests in the Arctic.  
By 2009 China’s present and future interests in the Arctic were creating enough buzz to 
induce a major journal dedicated to maritime affairs to jump into the fray. In the third 
issue of the 2009 volume of the Journal of the Ocean University of China (Social Sciences 
Edition), published by the Ocean University, the editors announced that with that issue 
they would be starting a “column” for research on polar region issues: 
The unique geographical locations and natural environments of the polar regions have 
determined their important positions in scientific research and international political law, 
and they have become the foci for research in many branches of learning. At present the 
polar regions are undergoing rapid atmospheric, land, oceanic, ecological, and social trans-
formations which will produce weighty influences on global climate and socioeconomic 
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development. Global environmental and political changes will have deep influence on 
the national rights and interests of every country, including China. The worth of polar 
region resources, scientific research, and environment have weighty significance for the 
future development of humankind, and especially the quantitative enormity of [the polar 
regions’] mineral and biological resources have in recent years elicited strong world at-
tention. Against the background of environmental transformation in the polar regions, 
in addition to strengthening natural science research in the polar regions, humanities and 
social science research on the polar regions with politics and law at the core is of great ur-
gency. “Preparedness ensures success, while unpreparedness spells failure.” Only with the 
development of forward-looking, in-depth research can [China] possess the right to speak 
up about future international affairs pertaining to the polar regions. To this end, with this 
issue this periodical is starting the “polar region issues” column, and it will continually 
present the newest results of research by our country’s scholars into humanities and social 
science aspects of the polar regions. At the same time, we welcome scholars inside and 
outside China involved in polar region research to submit manuscripts. [Let us] together 
create flourishing prospects for research on the polar regions.23 
A Uniquely Chinese Approach 
Li Zhenfu is easily among the most emphatic of Chinese commentators on Arctic issues. 
He has published several important articles on China’s interests in the Arctic issue and 
has actively applied rigorous social-science methodology to the topic. He has obvi-
ously had extensive exposure to Western geopolitical and social-science theory, and on 
occasion he sums up contentions and analyses with extensive summation equations 
that would be comprehensible only to the most positivistic of social scientists, as in two 
virtually identical articles published in 2009 involving SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, op-
portunities, and threats) analysis of the Arctic issue from China’s perspective.24 
But for all its theoretical content, Li’s writing can seem vague and nonspecific. It fre-
quently mentions China’s “rights and interests” in the Arctic but never quite gets around 
to defining or spelling them out. His articles clearly assume and argue that increased 
theoretical sophistication will help guarantee Chinese interests in the Arctic, but they 
do not specify how or why. They recommend injecting elements of traditional Chinese 
culture to produce a uniquely Chinese approach to Arctic geopolitical affairs but give no 
concrete specifics. 
One basic position seems to inform Li’s many articles: China wants and deserves a piece 
of the Arctic action even though it is not and never has been an Arctic state. It seems 
that for Li, China’s right of access to the Arctic is so self-evident and axiomatic as to 
require no elaboration or justification. He has yet to bring forth an effective argument 
in favor of China’s accelerated intervention in Arctic affairs that is not based squarely 
and unabashedly on China’s self-interest. He apparently regards issues of geographical 
propinquity and historical jurisdiction as largely irrelevant. 
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For Li Zhenfu, it seems, scientific expeditions and exploration are handmaidens to 
larger, nonscientific purposes. That is, Chinese scientific activity in the Arctic is clearly 
subservient and tributary to the nation’s geopolitical considerations and regional strate-
gic posturing. At one point, while discussing Chinese scientific investigations and polar 
explorations, Li even speaks of “the possibility of our country’s open declarations of 
sovereignty over the Arctic and Arctic sea routes, as well as territorial claims.”25 
Arctic Environmental Issues 
Very few Chinese articles on the nonscientific implications of Arctic affairs seem to 
discuss prevention or reversal of climate change. The phenomenon is fatalistically ac-
cepted as an accomplished fact and future trend; the only questions pertain to dealing 
with the changes, challenges, and opportunities it brings and formulating political, 
economic, diplomatic, and other non–hard science responses to it. Further, a consensus 
is evident that as far as the Arctic environment is concerned, existing environmental law 
is adequate for now and in the future might serve as the basis of more comprehensive 
international precedent, if not a full international treaty.  
The 2009 article that started the series on Arctic issues in the Journal of the Ocean Uni-
versity of China, “Research on the Issue of Arctic Environmental Law from the Point of 
View of International Law,” by Liu Huirong and Yang Fan of Ocean University’s School 
of Law and Political Science, is from start to finish an examination of environmental and 
legal issues pertaining to the Arctic.26 It contains no substantial discussion of specifically 
Chinese interests in the Arctic and does not regard or treat Arctic environmental issues 
as representing a legal or diplomatic back door through which China could enter the 
Arctic and then throw its weight around geopolitically. 
Liu and Yang bemoan the present lack of a comprehensive international Arctic treaty, 
and consider extensively the reasons for the “fragmentation of international law” as it 
pertains to the Arctic environment. They also discuss at some length the contradictions 
among various treaties and instruments of environmental law, as well as between na-
tional and international law. They then give suggestions for resolving these conflicts.27 In 
their conclusion they express optimism about UNCLOS as the best means for balancing 
international interests, characterizing the U.S. refusal to accede to the convention as an 
American liability: 
Looking far and wide at the legal documents which can resolve disputes related to the 
Arctic and how each state implements them, [it is our opinion that] UNCLOS is the most 
effective path for balancing the rights and interests among each of the signatory Arctic 
states. In the present disputes, with the exception of the United States, all other countries 
have already ratified UNCLOS. As a nonsignatory state to UNCLOS, in the midst of the 
disputes over resources which are growing fiercer by the day, the United States is meet-
ing up with risks and hazards [regarding access to] the rich resources of several thousand 
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square kilometers of continental shelf. The position of the U.S. as a nonsignatory state in 
reality impedes its protection of its maritime interests. To protect their rights and interests 
in the Arctic region, every state has started paying serious attention to UNCLOS and hopes 
to find in it the legal basis for supporting its positions, this in order to win advantageous 
positions in international court decisions and obtain the recognition of international 
society.
It is the authors’ opinion that [China] should proceed from the law of the sea, with  
UNCLOS as basis, and originate principles of the law of the sea directed solely at the 
Arctic. What is more, [China should] enable these principles to cover environmental pro-
tection, scientific research, resource development, and other realms. UNCLOS is already 
widely applied in the Arctic, and the main content of some of its articles is directed at 
environmental protection of ice-covered areas by littoral states. The main body of the Arc-
tic is an ocean surrounded by the territory of sovereign states, and because of this Arctic 
issues are essentially maritime issues. Although related countries all approve of UNCLOS 
as a basis for the resolution of Arctic issues, each country proceeds with indiscriminate 
interpretation of UNCLOS and other treaties in accordance with its own national rights 
and interests. What is more, there exist “defects” in UNCLOS itself. We should proceed 
with the development and improvement of its relevant systems, and we can especially go 
forth from the special system for “ice-covered areas” in striving for the founding of a set 
of new specialized systems, directed at Arctic circumstances, for the resolution of Arc-
tic environmental issues. Further, as a part of the helter-skelter Arctic international law 
system, UNCLOS still needs to resolve the issue of its conflict with other treaties. It can be 
seen that conflicts between treaties pertaining to the Arctic are far from being solvable in a 
day and a night.28
An article by Mei Hong in a subsequent 2009 number of Zhongguo Haiyang Daxue 
xuebao, is primarily (but not entirely) about how environmental law pertaining to the 
Arctic can lead to more comprehensive law. The piece especially covers sea routes, but 
Mei does not neglect environmental issues and in fact seems genuinely concerned about 
them. Arctic environmental concerns are not, for him, mere cynical ploys for achieving 
geopolitical or economic advantage. 
Mei observes that there are only two international treaties directly pertaining to the 
Arctic: the 1920 Svalbard Treaty and UNCLOS, of 1982. These he finds quite insufficient 
for the current disputes over Arctic sea route rights and interests. But Mei is a realist, 
and he faces up to current reality: “It would be difficult in the short term to shape the 
harmonized international will [necessary] for concluding a specialized treaty regard-
ing all aspects of legal issues pertaining to Arctic sea routes. Moreover, I fear it would be 
difficult for international legislation revolving around the Arctic sea routes to break free 
of the already-existent system of international law principles and set up an entirely new 
one.”29 
Mei echoes the insight of Guo Peiqing (Ocean University) that in essence Arctic disputes 
are maritime disputes. For Mei, the most extensive, albeit not comprehensive, body of 
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international law pertaining to the Arctic is environmental law, and at the bottom of 
international law is the international law of the sea (LOS). In fact, Mei sees LOS as the 
potential “source of the law”: 
For issues of maritime environmental protection relating to Arctic sea routes, it is not 
difficult to find the source of the law from amid the international law and international 
environmental protection principles over the last half a century or so. In view of this, this 
article takes the framework of international law, of which the main body is LOS, and [with 
it] investigates the revelations of related international law legal regulations toward Arctic 
sea route legal rules and regulations.30 
Mei traces the development of postwar international maritime environmental law in 
some detail. He covers the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
(CLC 1969), the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL 1973), and the establishment and development of the “prevention 
[precautionary?] principle” in international maritime environmental law.31 He notes that 
“the Arctic region is a region that is extremely sensitive to environmental pollution, and 
its population and culture are completely dependent on the ecological and environmen-
tal conditions of the region.”32 He ends his historical survey with two straightforward 
and descriptive paragraphs on the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 but offers no significant 
commentary on it.33 
Mei’s concluding paragraphs sum up his combined commercial, geopolitical, and en-
vironmental concerns about the Arctic region and convey his optimistic (perhaps even 
roseate) view of the future emergence of international law pertaining to the Arctic: 
In a word, international legislation on maritime environmental protection has already es-
tablished, from the prevention of pollution from ships and the prevention of waste dump-
ing at sea, the basic system for combined maritime management. What is more, under the 
guidance of the “prevention principle,” [the system] is continually being developed and 
perfected. 
Today, despite the variegated and complicated situation revolving around the disputes 
of each country pertaining to Arctic sea route rights and interests, mutual convergences 
of considerations regarding rights and interests also exist. Although enormous commer-
cial rights and interests exist pertaining to the opening of Arctic sea routes, giving due 
consideration to the protection of maritime environment and Arctic ecology is a common 
understanding of each state. Protecting the maritime environment from harm and attach-
ing importance to managing multiple ecological systems in opening and managing Arctic 
sea routes are basic requirements for the opening and plying [of ships] along sea routes. 
Protecting the maritime environment of Arctic sea routes and safeguarding the great-
est common rights and interests of humankind—doing no harm to ecological rights and 
interests, guarding against ecological hazards, and preventing and controlling ecological 
damage—[these] are issues pertaining to the opening up and management of Arctic sea 
routes that cannot be overlooked. Not only should the Arctic countries pay close attention 
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to ecological protection in the Arctic, but [all of] international society should pass per-
fected or newly created regulations in international law to safeguard the ecological rights 
and interests commonly enjoyed by all of humankind regarding the Arctic. 
The scholar [Robert] Wade of the London School of Economics has said, in an article 
entitled “Why a Warmer Arctic Needs New Laws” and published in England’s Financial 
Times, that because of intensifying global warming, the Arctic Ocean will become the front 
line of battles over economic rivalries.* Against this background, international society 
must produce regulations pertaining to maritime environmental protection of Arctic sea 
routes and ecological protection of the polar regions. Carrying on discussions concern-
ing the environmental protection of Arctic sea routes and coming up with specialized 
regulations are the significances which the further development of international maritime 
environmental legislation should have. Of course, specialized regulations should build 
upon the foundation of already existing international laws and regulations, turn relevant 
rules in current international law into the origin of laws, and direct them at the uniqueness 
of the Arctic ocean areas, all in order to come up with regulations in the manner of special 
agreements.34 
An article published in 2010 by Dong Yue and two other scholars at the School of Law 
and Political Science considers the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) as a 
“soft law” factor in Arctic environmental protection. After wrestling with definitions and 
conceptualizations of soft law, the article considers AEPS along with AMAP (the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Program), EPPR (Energy Prevention, Preparedness, and 
Response), PAME (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment), and CAFF (Conser-
vation of Arctic Flora and Fauna). It argues that although there is widespread consensus 
about AEPS in the international community and despite its current soft-law status as 
the standard or norm for Arctic environmental protection, AEPS has drawbacks such as 
practical limitations and lack of enforceability. This is ultimately a question of “what is” 
and “what ought to be,” Dong and his coauthors contend: 
Although we fully recognize the Arctic environmental management functions brought 
into play by AEPS and the Arctic Council, we should also see that except for the aforesaid 
functions, it brings very few other functions into play, especially toward member state leg-
islation, judicature, and enforcement. Many work plans and research results remain at the 
preliminary level, and there is no way for them to be transformed into concrete restrictive 
directives. Further, the Arctic Council established by AEPS as the largest inter-governmental 
agency has no policy-making authority, no organizational capabilities, no control over 
resources, and no right to restrict member states. The Arctic Council also has no standing 
as an international legal personality, and is only a high-level forum for “endeavoring to 
promote cooperation pertaining to sustainable development, environmental protection, 
and other common issues among Arctic states in the circum-Arctic region.” The position 
of the Arctic Council is similar to that of “The Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe,” APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation], or the Group of 77.35
* Mei Hong erroneously gives the affiliation as “London School of Political Economy” (Lundun Zhengzhi 
Jingji Xueyuan) and the title as “A Warmer Arctic Needs Shipping Regulations.”—Trans. 
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Nonetheless, AEPS and its related organizations and measures are still useful as transi-
tions to hard international law pertaining to the Arctic, the authors conclude: 
In summation of the above, it would be extremely difficult to conclude a uniform environ-
mental treaty in the Arctic. AEPS is absolutely not the best choice for “what ought to be,” 
but an inevitable choice of “what is” under the circumstances. From a certain level this ex-
plains the relationship of soft law to hard law: Under the new challenges international law 
faces, there are many circumstances in which soft law is a transitional means to an end. But 
there are also some circumstances under which soft law exists independently and [indeed] 
must exist independently. Further, between [soft law] and hard law there exists a relation-
ship of “is” and “ought to be,” of “practical choice” and “ideal prospects.”36
Watching the Chinese Watch the A5 
After making the standard observation that the Arctic potentially contains 25 percent 
of the world’s oil and natural gas, 9 percent of the world’s coal, and large amounts of 
diamonds, gold, and uranium, Xu Zhenwei and Xu Yuanyuan use game theory and the 
prisoner’s dilemma to explain why Russia, Canada, and the United States do not adopt 
cooperative, simultaneous measures regarding the Arctic but instead opt for conten-
tious stratagems and postures.37 They make extensive use of matrices in their analysis, 
but at one point they briefly change their analytical metaphor from gaming to one of 
staged performance: “On the scramble-for-Arctic-sovereignty stage the three states busy 
themselves until they are dizzy: ‘After you’re through singing I’ll mount the stage.’ One 
side adduces evidence and another side refutes it and brings up its own evidence, around 
and around in circles. As yet no state has produced compelling evidence that persuades 
the minds and mouths of the other two. What will be the results if they just keep going 
on this way?”38 
The two authors then work through more matrices and ultimately propose a solution: 
cooperation and coordination. They conclude with a recommendation for noncircum-
polar countries: 
Noncircumpolar states should also be highly concerned with Arctic issues and not stand 
idly by with hands in pockets. This is because Arctic issues have a bearing on the exis-
tence and development of all humankind. The international community should press the 
circumpolar countries to talk things through peacefully, work out effective laws, expedi-
tiously establish effective mechanisms for handling Arctic issues, and reasonably develop 
and exploit Arctic resources so that all countries can, on a cooperative basis, be winners.39
Canada’s Arctic Claims 
Although Canada joined UNCLOS, Mei Hong and Wang Zengzhen assert in their 
sprawling and discursive article on Canada and the Arctic, nobody has been able to stop 
Canada from attempting to designate Arctic Ocean areas adjacent to the North Ameri-
can mainland as Canadian internal waters. The Canadians base their stance on two 
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grounds, Mei and Wang observe: straight baselines and historical possession. They trace 
the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ’s) straight-baseline concept to the Fisheries Case 
(United Kingdom v. Norway) of 1951 and criticize the straight-baseline concept as vague 
and subjective. Nonetheless, they are convinced, Canada can always find a pretext for its 
claims under the straight-baseline doctrine.  For instance, the sphere of Inuit activity, 
they observe, is not limited to the land areas of the Arctic archipelagoes but extends into 
perennially ice-covered areas, thus blurring the territorial distinction between ice and 
land. If Canada did not place these ice-covered areas under its land jurisdiction, they 
believe, there could be broad, negative implications for Canada’s interests.40 
Mei and Wang then quote article 234 of UNCLOS, which specifies regulations for ice-
covered areas: 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations 
for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered 
areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone where particularly severe climatic 
conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstruc-
tions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could 
cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and 
regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. 
Mei and Wang end their analysis of Canada’s straight-baseline claims with a concession 
that Canada’s interests, jurisdiction, and claims in the Arctic region are more substantive 
and reasonable than those of other countries: 
The stability of the ecological system in the ice-covered areas of the Arctic is without 
doubt, quite fragile. Speaking from the viewpoint of the global nature of ecological protec-
tion, every country has the right and the obligation to protect the ecological environment 
of the Arctic Ocean. Nonetheless, speaking from a practical level, the levels of interests and 
interconnectedness of the areas of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to mainland North America 
are different than those of other countries. For example, the connectedness of Canada 
to the environmental interests of this region are certainly stronger than those of Britain, 
France, or other countries.41
Mei and Wang point out that the international community does not support Canada’s 
claim to sovereignty over Arctic waters. UNCLOS’s regulations concerning ice-covered 
waters are doubtless music to Canadian ears, they write, but they add that these regula-
tions could wind up working against Canada’s interests, because gradual global climate 
change might transform ice-covered areas into non-ice-covered ones. Thus, article 234 
of UNCLOS may lose its meaning, they maintain. 
They then argue once again that Britain, which once controlled huge segments of North 
America, never hinted at British North American authority over the Arctic Ocean. Their 
clear implication is that Canada inherited nothing from Britain as far as the Arctic 
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Ocean is concerned and that Canada’s claims to it are its own twentieth-century contriv-
ances. They seem genuinely appalled that in 1970 Canada followed common interna-
tional practice and extended its territorial waters from three nautical miles to twelve, 
thus turning the Barrow Strait into its internal waters. Canada’s designation in 1985 
of the waters around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (CAA) as internal waters is also 
distasteful to them, in part because it made use of the straight-baseline concept. 
The two authors note with a certain alacrity that both the United States and the Euro-
pean Community (now the European Union) were and are strongly opposed to these 
Canadian territorial waters claims and have stated so publicly.42
What Should China Do? 
There is debate and difference among Chinese academics about policy recommendation 
to the government. In 2009 Li Zhenfu published two virtually identical articles on inter-
ests in the Arctic in which he recommended that China play an active, preemptive, and 
vigilant role in Arctic affairs.43 Linda Jakobson has already pointed out Li’s contention 
that “whoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new passage of world 
economics and world strategies.”44 Li argues, after applying SWOT analysis, that China 
should adopt a multipronged national strategy toward Arctic sea routes. First, he urges 
full Chinese participation in the development of Arctic sea routes. China should do this 
because of the obvious economic and strategic importance of the Arctic region, but also 
because of the wealth of natural resources there: “In addition to Russia, the Arctic littoral 
states Canada, the U.S., Norway, and Denmark all want to dip their cups into the rich 
stew of oil and natural gas in the Arctic Ocean.” Involvement in the development of Arc-
tic sea routes will, Li argues, be China’s entrée into other Arctic matters as well, including 
the development of its natural resources. Thus, in the struggle over the Arctic “China 
should, at the national level, rely on real strengths in the formulation of international 
law, scientific investigations, and jurisdiction over resources and sea routes and do its ut-
most in the Arctic to make its own voice heard and strengthen its own right to speak up. 
Only those who become owners of resources will be able to obtain their rightful value.”45 
Second, Li continues, China should determine the appropriate and opportune occasions 
for entering specific Arctic issues. Earlier is not necessarily always better in these matters, 
he advises. Nonetheless, the time for concern about Arctic sea routes is at hand. Given 
the large importance of these routes to Chinese economic development, he argues, it is 
important for China to participate in issues pertaining to them right now, while there 
are still no clearly defined or harmonized international mechanisms or principles for 
dealing with them. In this way, when international mechanisms are formed China will 
be in an advantageous position. 
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Li Zhenfu makes more ambitious recommendations for the safety and convenience of 
Chinese ships operating in the future in an ice-free Arctic. First, he suggests strength-
ened satellite monitoring of the Arctic: “The resolution of synthetic aperture radar in 
monitoring and tracking sea ice has already achieved accuracy to within a few meters 
and completely satisfies our needs. It is, however, relatively expensive. The precision of 
geosynchronous satellite observation at high latitudes is quite low, even to the point of 
unobservability.”46 If, he then points out, polar satellites (nongeosynchronous, of course) 
were deployed to monitor the Northwest Passage, it would be necessary to receive data 
from them in one-to-two-hour cycles. This in turn would entail deploying at least three 
such satellites, perhaps more. Given the difficulties involved, he concludes, cooperating 
with several other countries in satellite monitoring of the Arctic would be better than 
going it alone.47 
Li then proceeds to recommendations for Chinese enterprises, which he makes within 
the framework of his national strategic program for opening and developing Arctic sea 
routes. First, he suggests developing and improving ice-resistant, ice-breaking, and lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) vessels. 
Second, he urges shipping enterprises to take advantage of the present opportunity to 
extend their “value chains.” Third, he encourages the development of “fourth-party 
logistics” enterprises (that is, specializing in logistics, transportation, and supply-chain 
management). The Arctic is poised to become a region of pivotal global significance, he 
argues, and the region is a natural and practical catalyst for such operations. 
Li concludes his ambitious set of recommendations with a note of urgency: 
The issue of Arctic sea routes is becoming more and more important because the antici-
pated melting of the Arctic Ocean has accelerated. China cannot lose its right to speak up 
on this issue and must struggle for the initiative in international mechanisms pertaining  
to Arctic issues so that these mechanisms make accurate designations for China’s Arctic 
strategy. This article has adopted analytic hierarchy process and SWOT analytical methods 
in analyzing China’s Arctic sea route strategy and concludes that in facing the issue of  
Arctic sea routes, China should adopt a “winning strategy” [zhengqu zhanlue], seize the  
opportune moment, and actively participate in the formulation of harmonized mecha-
nisms pertaining to Arctic sea route issues, all so that China acquires the rights and inter-
ests it deserves. My research results can help the [Chinese] government and enterprises 
understand the current condition of Arctic sea route issues, formulate Arctic sea route 
strategies, and come up with a practical and feasible program to aid in implementing  
these recommendations.48
In another article published in 2009, Li Zhenfu starts out with observations on the 
Arctic’s key importance and then delves into how China should deal with obstacles to 
its participation in Arctic affairs: “The Arctic region contains rich stores of petroleum, 
natural gas, mineral, and seafood resources. Approximately one fourth of the petroleum 
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and natural resources untapped by humankind are in the Arctic. . . . After the Northwest 
Passage is opened up it will become a new ‘axial sea route between Atlantic and Pacific,’ 
and the sea route between Europe, Asia, and North America will be shortened by 5,200 
to 7,000 nautical miles. Whoever controls the Arctic sea routes will control the world 
economy and a new internationally strategic corridor.”49 
Li next outlines the practical, energy security, and world-peace significance of the Arctic 
region. As far as its practical significance, he has only the jejune observation that “rights, 
interests, and resources are, from beginning to end, the focus of international competi-
tion.” The United States, Russia, and Canada are scheming to take over the natural re-
sources and strategic utility of the Arctic region for themselves, he more or less contends, 
and if that situation is allowed to continue China will be reduced to the status of passive 
observer in Arctic affairs. China’s lack of a developed and systematic approach to Arctic 
affairs constrains its right to speak up about them and deprives the nation of its rightful 
interests and international stature, which does not bode well in the long term for global 
security and interests, he argues. 
As for the energy security significance of the Arctic, Li’s perspective is more or less that 
internationalization of the Arctic sea routes will help China avoid piracy, terrorism, and 
the interruption of maritime traffic these problems can cause. Li attempts to link China’s 
Arctic interests with world peace: 
The vying for Arctic sea routes is becoming fiercer and fiercer, and if latent contradictions 
are not quickly and appropriately dealt with, it is possible that there will be grave threats to 
world peace and international security. Our country is a country that advocates peace, and 
it should take active interest in the state of Arctic developments. [China should] respond 
directly to transformations in the patterns of Arctic sea route rights and interests in order 
to protect world security and make its rightful contributions to the sustainable develop-
ment of humankind.50 
Li seems to feel that increased Chinese participation in international mechanisms per-
taining to Arctic affairs will somehow prevent Canada from exercising sovereignty over 
the Northwest Passage. There are, according to him, three possible options for Chinese 
participation in these mechanisms: hegemonic dominance, in which China requires the 
formulations, alterations, and improvements of these mechanisms to conform with its 
national interests; passive receptivity, in which China accepts formulations arrived at by 
these mechanisms under the influence of other countries, thereby assuming the resulting 
obligations and enjoying the relevant rights and interests; and active participation in said 
international mechanisms, for the benefit of both China and the rights and interests of 
most other countries.
Li does not consider the first option to be viable, because China “has not yet met the de-
mands to become a leading state in international mechanisms and at present has neither 
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the real power nor the strategic will to act as a leading state.”51 He dismisses the second 
option summarily: “This is because most present international mechanisms have been 
guided and established by a minority of great Western powers and reflect the imperatives 
of their own self-interests. It would be difficult for them to avoid their existent limita-
tions and defects. They would pose serious restrictions to China’s struggle for Arctic sea 
route rights and interests.”52
This leads teleologically to his third and final option: active Chinese participation in 
international mechanisms. This may or not represent Li’s ideal option, but given present 
realities, it is for him obviously the only viable one: 
Based on China’s present combined national power, international position, and self-interest 
imperatives, choosing active participation in international mechanisms tallies best with 
China’s basic national situation and practical needs. Active participation in the formula-
tions, revisions, and improvements of international mechanisms dealing with Arctic affairs 
is an effective avenue and the best choice for realizing China’s Arctic sea route rights and 
interest imperatives, accelerating its economic and social development, bringing into play 
China’s functions as a responsible major power in the international arena, and hastening 
the rationalization and democratization of international relations.53
Having made this major recommendation, Li then proceeds to discuss three serious 
impediments or obstacles to effective Chinese participation in these mechanisms. First 
he covers the obvious advantages of the five Arctic littoral states. The A5—Canada, 
Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States—are already there; in 
August 2007 the Russians even placed a titanium flag of their nation at the bottom of the 
Arctic Ocean. That same month Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada announced 
the establishment of two new military facilities in the Arctic as indications of his nation’s 
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage region and the seabed of the Arctic Ocean. These 
and other actions and stances by the A5 and A8 countries will, Li argues, make it more 
difficult for China to participate in Arctic affairs. 
Li identifies the second major impediment as, collectively, the sector principle (the “fan-
shaped principle,” in Chinese parlance) and the continental shelf system. Li has special 
scorn for the sector principle, which Canada first announced in 1907 and which holds 
that Canadian territory and territorial waters extend in a pie-shaped (or fan-shaped) 
wedge all the way to the North Pole. The Soviet Union produced a similar pattern in 
1926, announcing that all land and islands within its bounds, as yet discovered or not, 
were Soviet territory. Between them these Canadian and Soviet territorial claims account 
for the vast majority of Arctic territory, and for this reason Li finds them particularly ob-
jectionable: “Although the sector principle has met with opposition from the other Arc-
tic Ocean littoral states Denmark, Finland [sic], Norway, and the U.S., at a certain level it 
still holds some sway. If Arctic countries insist on this principle it will undoubtedly lead 
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to the opened Arctic sea routes being placed within the sovereign spheres of Arctic states, 
and China will have lost its strategic position in Arctic sea routes.”54 
Li turns next to the legal concept of the continental shelf, another obstacle he sees to 
China’s pursuit of position and influence in the Arctic. Observing that the idea was first 
brought up by the American president Harry S. Truman, he discusses the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, the incorporation of its principles within UNCLOS in 1982, 
the advent of two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones, and the possible 
extension of outer continental shelves beyond two hundred nautical miles by application 
to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The latter de-
velopment could lead to the corresponding designation of extended shelves in the Arctic, 
very clearly a problem for Li, because 
if the islands of the said region [the Arctic] come under clear national jurisdiction, then 
the countries will have territorial sovereignty over them, and in accordance with UNCLOS 
they can once again designate their territorial waters and the sea areas over which there 
is national jurisdiction. . . . According to principles formed from this, the current “public 
territory” [gongtu] in the Arctic will be very advantageous for the Arctic Ocean littoral 
states, and particularly for Canada and Russia. In accordance with this development, the 
difficulties for China’s participation in international mechanisms dealing with Arctic sea 
routes would be greatly increased and would influence [China’s] obtaining of its rightful 
rights and interests in Arctic sea routes.55  
The third and final obstacle to Chinese participation in Arctic affairs is, as Li character-
izes it, a “theoretical” one, in that current international mechanisms are based on “West-
ern” values of freedom, equality, and democracy: 
The theories of the international mechanisms the world now has were all formulated un-
der the guidance of developed Western countries. The theoretical bases for these formula-
tions are freedom, equality, democracy, and other such Western rational concepts [linian]. 
Because of this, in their fundamental nature all international mechanisms currently in 
effect are, along with their theories, heavily colored by liberalism.56 There are obvious 
discrepancies between the theories of international mechanisms formulated in accordance 
with freedom, equality, democracy, and other Western rational concepts on the one hand 
and the basic social system and mainstream ideology of China on the other. As a result, 
China’s participation in international mechanisms is restrained, and this in turn has led to 
China’s shortcomings in international mechanism theory and has created China’s current 
failure at formulating an international mechanism theoretical system which has rigorous 
logic and strong interpretive capabilities.57
Having identified these obstacles, Li recommends countermeasures for surmounting 
them. With Canada clearly in mind, he strongly urges comprehensive and penetrating 
examinations of the “corrupt and abusive malpractices” (biduan) inherent in the sector 
principle and the continental shelf system. China should do this in order to participate 
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effectively in international mechanisms dealing with Arctic affairs and thereby to avoid 
losing its “right to speak up” (huayu quan). 
According to Li there are three ways of attacking the sector principle. First of all, “the 
‘sector principle’ is a theory based mainly on the principle of adjacency, and the com-
mon failing [tongbing] of the theory of adjacency is that it does not explore questions of 
authority under the conditions of common rights and interests.” Li’s second mode of at-
tack reduces the sector principle to a crude and illegitimate landgrab by Canada and the 
Soviet Union: “The sector principle was a unilateral agreement concerning rights and 
interests, one based on the unique geographical position of the Arctic. ‘Manufactured’ 
as it was by the governments of Canada and the former Soviet Union in order to accrue 
more Arctic territory, it inevitably contains some fallacies. Further, it is not suitable for 
application in regions which include territorial waters.”58 
His third avenue of attack on the sector principle focuses on its lack of international 
acceptance: “The sector principle has been opposed by all countries except Canada 
and Russia. The United States and other countries have been especially strong in their 
opposition, and this will impel the majority of countries concerned with the rights and 
interests of Arctic sea routes to form an alliance of international mechanisms. This will 
also weaken their [Canada’s and Russia’s] influence on China’s participation in interna-
tional mechanisms dealing with Arctic sea routes.”59 
Within this broad countermeasure, Li then turns his attention to continental shelf issues 
and attempts to dismantle and deconstruct them by distinguishing between “sover-
eignty” and “sovereign rights.”60 (Interestingly enough, he does not mention China’s own 
use of continental shelf arguments as part of its rationale for claiming Taiwan and the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.) 
Concerning the “continental shelf system,” our country should emphasize that the author-
ity of littoral states over their continental shelves is sovereign authority [zhuquan quanli] 
and not sovereignty [zhuquan]. Even though what the Arctic Ocean countries emphasize 
in the Arctic region is their own sovereignty, what is produced according to the conti-
nental shelf system within the international law of the sea is sovereign authority and not 
sovereignty. There is a distinction between the two.61
Another countermeasure for which Li Zhenfu argues concerns the theory underpinning 
international mechanisms. China is deficient in this regard and not up to international 
standards, he argues. He recommends that China diligently construct its own theoretical 
system for understanding and more effectively participating in international mecha-
nisms, which he sees as now dominated by Western views. In the construction of its 
theoretical system, China should bear three things in mind. First, it should base such a 
system on Chinese culture and what he calls “China’s own traditional diplomatic cul-
ture” (something this diplomatic historian finds somewhat bizarre and alarming).62 This 
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new theoretical system must comport with “China’s national situation” and its struggle 
for interests in the Arctic sea routes. 
Second, Li strongly recommends deep and penetrating analysis of the theory of “West-
ern” international mechanisms, especially as they pertain to the handling of Arctic sea 
route issues. This would be to the benefit of China, he argues: China could then show 
how scientific and reasonable its positions on Arctic affairs are. He urges his fellow 
Chinese to avoid a purely doctrinal or conceptual approach, recommending instead that 
China proceed from the rights, interests, and needs of all humanity in making its own 
constructive contributions to rational international dialogue on Arctic issues. Sophis-
tication in this would, Li argues, give China “theoretical prestige” and strengthen its 
stature and international influence in issues concerning Arctic sea routes.
Third, Li promotes protecting and developing China’s sea power by means of UNCLOS. 
The transit-passage regime affords more freedom of movement for Chinese vessels than 
innocent passage, Li argues; it helps Chinese ships avoid being treated in a discrimina-
tory manner or being impeded in their navigation, and it benefits China’s economic 
development and expansion into global sea routes. UNCLOS can also be instrumental, 
he argues, in securing international access to the natural resource wealth of the Arctic 
Ocean’s seabed: “In accordance with the spirit of UNCLOS, sea areas under international 
jurisdiction are mainly formed from the high seas and international waters, and it is 
a rule that every country enjoys equal freedom on the high seas. International seabed 
regions and their resources are the shared heritage and wealth of humankind.” 
Li does, however, sound a note of caution about UNCLOS: if it is a “beneficial weapon” 
for resolving some of China’s maritime rights and interests, it cannot be the only 
weapon.63 This is because some of UNCLOS is vague and general. He argues that China 
should endeavor to clear up and supplement the vague provisions of UNCLOS and also 
“do its best to put an end to all pretexts and opportunities used by foreign countries to 
encroach upon our country’s Arctic sea route rights and interests.”64
Li ends his article with three conclusions:  
1.  In actuality, the Arctic is not part of any country. But in addition to the Arctic littoral 
states the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, other countries have announced 
to the outside [world] that they have partial sovereignty over the Arctic. The [current 
Arctic] situation resembles the scramble for sovereignty over the Antarctic in bygone 
years. If this type of wrangling is not handled appropriately, it could seriously influ-
ence world security. China is a newly resurgent world-class power and also a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council. How China should assume its own 
role in this [international] chess match and bring its own purposes into play is already 
an obviously very important and necessary [consideration].
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2.  Due to regional factors and the current system of international law, there are practical 
obstacles to China’s participation in solving Arctic sea route issues. Also because of this, 
our country’s obtaining of Arctic sea route rights and interests will be impeded. 
3.  [Natural] resources are of the utmost importance to any major power, and our country 
should also exert itself in striving for the gigantic resources of the Arctic. For us, staying 
aloof from [Arctic] affairs would, without a doubt, be automatic relinquishment [of our 
interests in them]. Research has shown that we can punch through obstacles and ac-
tively participate in the solutions to Arctic sea route issues. Further, as a signatory state 
to UNCLOS, we have the right to share in rights to the [natural] resources of the region 
and to freely enter into the Arctic and other regions of the high seas. The government 
of China should take active interest in the state of Arctic developments and make our 
own reactions with specific regard [to them] so that we are not marginalized in this new 
world hot spot region [and in this way] make our rightful contributions to the protec-
tion of world security and the sustainable development of humankind.65
In yet a further article, published in 2010, Li Zhenfu applies another fashionable theo-
retical approach, in this case complex networks, to China’s interests in Arctic geopolitical 
issues. He ends up suggesting geopolitical tactics that have some overlap with the recom-
mendations of his 2009 articles. 
1.  Protect and Develop China’s Sea Power. In present and future geopolitical issues pertain-
ing to the Arctic and Arctic sea routes, China should, first of all, abide by relevant regu-
lations in UNCLOS and also effectively make advantageous use of the Convention in 
protecting our country’s geopolitical rights and interests in Arctic sea routes. Secondly, 
we should take the new circumstances which have appeared since the Convention took 
effect as turning points, adopting follow-up actions and flexible, dexterous measures, 
doing our utmost to cause the Convention to be useful to us, tending toward its advan-
tages and avoiding its disadvantages, applying practical actions to compensate for the 
vague and unclear articles in the convention, and protecting at the highest limits our 
country’s rights and interests pertaining to Arctic sea routes. 
2.  Formulate a Contingency Plan for Dealing with Crises in Geopolitical Issues. At present 
China needs to engage in deep introspections and all-around considerations of its geo-
political tactics concerning Arctic sea route issues. First, we should adhere to inherent 
principles and actively give impetus to international society’s establishment of frame-
works and mechanisms for the common opening up and exploitation of the Arctic and 
Arctic sea routes and exert ourselves to ensure the openness and fairness of Arctic and 
Arctic sea route development so that the Arctic sea region brings benefit to all human-
kind and not [merely] individual countries and [nonstate] actors. Second, starting 
now we must set our hands to preparing for responses to situations involving forcible, 
out-of-control [attempts at] carving up the [Arctic] melon and Arctic sea route rights 
and interests. This includes clearly expressing to international society our worries and 
resolute positions in this regard, establishing a combined scientific research and crisis 
response center, formulating long-term Arctic and Arctic sea route development strate-
gies and a contingency plan for dealing with crises in the geopolitical patterns of Arctic 
sea routes, increasing the strength of [China’s] involvement in scientific investigations 
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and polar explorations (especially so that the possibility of our country’s open declara-
tions of sovereignty over the Arctic and Arctic sea routes, as well as territorial claims, 
cannot be eliminated), and building up an appropriate oceangoing navigational strength 
as a guarantee [of our Arctic rights and interests]. 
3.  Diligently Structure a Chinese Geopolitical Theory System for the Arctic and Arctic Sea 
Routes. Of the obstacles our country faces in the fight over geopolitical rights and inter-
ests pertaining to Arctic sea routes, more are embodied by the phenomena of inconsis-
tencies which exist between harmonized international mechanisms on the one hand and 
our country’s culture and theoretical systems on the other. Accordingly, China should 
actively participate in structuring Arctic sea route geopolitical international mechanisms 
and also establish a Chinese Arctic sea route geopolitical theory system. In establishing 
a Chinese Arctic sea route geopolitical theory system, we should stress holding to the 
following: First, deeply researching Western geopolitical theory, drawing lessons from 
its positive factors for our use and injecting new impetus and vitality into traditional 
Chinese Arctic sea route geopolitical concepts; second, with a foothold in traditional 
Chinese culture, starting out from our own geopolitical philosophy and geopolitical 
concepts and structuring a theoretical system which tallies with China’s national situ-
ation and practical needs; and third, consciously punching through the trammels of 
some customary and set ways of thinking, doing more to prove from the point of view 
of theory the reasonableness and scientific nature of our own positions and stances, and 
not just analyzing Arctic sea route geopolitical issues from the point of view of morals 
and ethics.66
Not everyone in China concerned with Arctic affairs has been persuaded by Li Zhenfu’s 
energetic recommendations and his seeming methodological and analytical rigor. 
Mei Hong and Wang Zengzhen find the possibility of internationalizing Arctic waters 
infinitesimally small and the resolution of the legal position of these waters fraught with 
difficulties. Such major controversial issues should, they argue in their article published 
in 2010, be set aside in favor of cooperation on issues on which there is some consensus 
or common understanding, such as international environmental law. From there China 
can, they continue, endeavor to broaden and deepen its participation in international 
cooperative efforts. 
In this connection Mei and Wang make three recommendations. First, China should 
strive to elevate environmental protection in the Arctic to the level of international 
cooperation. Nonetheless, they recognize that deepening such cooperation may be quite 
difficult, given the political and ideological obstacles involved. China has much to learn 
from advanced countries about environmental protection, they point out, and in the 
process of international cooperation on this issue China might encounter opportunities 
for more substantive political cooperation as well. 
Their second recommendation is presented indirectly, as a series of pointed questions: 
How many icebreakers does China have? How many Arctic expeditions has China 
organized? How capable is China of organizing a complete and independent scientific 
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expedition to the Arctic? (The strong implication of these questions is, of course, that 
China ought to get busy building icebreakers and launching Arctic expeditions.) Chinese 
scholars have a long and difficult road ahead of them, Mei and Wang maintain, if they 
are to get China’s viewpoints in circulation. If China wants the right to speak up on, and 
participate in, Arctic issues, the Chinese people and government need to work effectively 
together, they argue.
Third, they recommend that China not press, for the time being, for a uniform Arctic 
treaty, because the negotiations for it would be too difficult and obstacle ridden. They 
conclude that China should instead seek to cooperate where cooperation is possible and 
wait until the time is right for a uniform Arctic treaty.67
Nonetheless, the two authors adhere to the proposition that the Arctic does not belong 
to any one state or group of states but is an international region and issue: 
The Arctic sea areas constitute a region for the common and shared enjoyment of hu-
mankind. The entire series of activities in Arctic sea areas such as ecological protection, 
environmental pollution prevention, and the development of natural resources does 
not depend on the strength of one or more circum-Arctic states to be up to the task. In 
consideration of the future of humankind, strengthened cooperation by every country in 
Arctic sea area issues is very important. The strategy for sustainable development demands 
that rational people carefully deliberate on how to open up the Arctic sea areas, and also 
that they establish good legal order in the Arctic. It can be imagined that an Arctic sea area 
which embodies the civilization of humankind and yet does not lose its natural charac-
teristics will provide important development space for all humankind. In this process, 
although we are not optimistic about the prospects for internationalizing the Arctic, we do 
support our country’s active participation in Arctic affairs.68
Some Chinese academics writing on Arctic affairs have sought to remind their country-
men and government of the uncertainties and perils of the region’s sea routes. Their 
sobering observations about the viability of directing extensive shipping through them 
might explain in part the restraint Beijing has thus far displayed in its policy on Arctic 
affairs: 
Chinese Arctic specialists acknowledge the same uncertainties as many of their Western 
counterparts when contemplating how lucrative the Arctic [sea] routes would ultimately 
be in comparison to the current routes through the Suez and Panama canals. Although 
passage along the Northern Sea Route from eastern China to Western Europe would 
substantially shorten the journey, high insurance premiums, lack of infrastructure and 
harsh conditions may make the Arctic [sea] routes commercially unviable, at least in the 
short term. Drift ice will continue to be a problem for ships even when the Arctic passages 
are officially deemed ice-free. Because of the melting of Greenland’s ice cap, the number of 
icebergs is expected to increase, forcing ships to proceed at a slow speed and make detours. 
Furthermore, the shallow depth of some of the passages along the shipping routes (in 
particular the Bering Strait) makes the Arctic unsuited for big cargo ships.69
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It is noteworthy that Canadian geographer Frédéric Lasserre has made similar observa-
tions: “The Northwest Passage is not a deepwater passage: larger tankers and carriers will 
not be able to use it, at least not if they are loaded with cargo, unless they use McClure 
Strait, which only recently (2007) saw the ice disappear for a very short period of time.”70 
Nonetheless, estimates and predictions of the first occurrence of ice-free summer sea-
sons for the Arctic vary widely, ranging from as early as 2013 to as late as 2060. Accord-
ing to U.S. Navy rear admiral David Titley, “We believe that sometime between 2035 and 
2040, there is a pretty good chance that the Arctic Ocean will be essentially ice-free for 
about a month.”71 
The Arctic and Antarctica: Poles Apart? 
Could a model, analogue, or precedent for resolving claims to the Arctic and preventing 
war in the region be found in the suspension of competing claims of sovereignty over 
Antarctica with the Antarctic Treaty System of 1959? Li Zhenfu notes in passing that the 
current struggle over the Arctic bears some resemblance to the former struggle over the 
Antarctic;72 Jia Yu of the China Institute for Marine Affairs in Beijing suggests that the 
settlement of the Antarctic issue might be of use in current Arctic disputes: “The ‘Antarc-
tic Treaty’ system froze the claims of relevant countries to territorial sovereignty over 
mainland Antarctica and guaranteed the ‘deep slumber’ of the continent of Antarctica 
for many decades. Could a more concrete treaty for the Arctic also be formulated, one 
that would cause the opening up and exploitation of the Arctic region to benefit all 
humankind?”73
But in China the consensus among in-depth considerations of the Antarctic model 
seems to be that it is inapplicable to the Arctic situation. For example, in an article 
published in 2009, Dong Yue of the Ocean University of China expresses doubt that the 
Antarctic Treaty could ever be a model or precedent for a corresponding Arctic Treaty 
and argues that the framework for the international law of the sea is a more hopeful 
prospect for resolving Arctic disputes. Dong’s reasons are, first, the foundational factors 
of the Antarctic legal system differ greatly from those of the Arctic, the Arctic being not 
a solitary continent but a region in which eight states exist; second, the sovereignty of 
Arctic states in the Arctic cannot be frozen, and development in the Arctic has already 
been a historical reality for some time; and third, there are basic differences between 
the Svalbard or Spitsbergen Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty, with the former affirm-
ing Norway’s sovereignty over the Svalbard Islands but the latter freezing all claims of 
sovereignty over the Arctic.74 Dong also points out that the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 
indicates this impossibility:
In summation of the above, establishing in the Arctic a uniform treaty system similar to 
the Antarctic Treaty, thereby setting aside disputes and engaging in joint development, is 
not feasible. The actions of Arctic countries are proof of this article’s viewpoints. The five 
26 china maritime studies
Arctic littoral states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States) stated in 
the Ilulissat Declaration that “this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible 
management by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national im-
plementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop 
a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.” This point 
shows that the A5 states already uniformly reject the possibility of accepting the conclusion 
of a new Antarctic-style uniform treaty.75
Dong’s hope and contention is that the current international law of the sea, not an ideal 
treaty modeled after the Antarctic Treaty out there somewhere on the Platonic plane, can 
serve as the basis for future resolutions to current Arctic disputes and that China will 
have some input in this process: 
So where, after all, is the path for resolving Arctic legal disputes? The declaration of the five 
states gives the answer just the same, and that is in making full use of the current system-
atic framework of the international law of the sea. In actuality, up until the present the 
relevant stances of the Arctic littoral countries toward outer continental shelves have not 
broken through the system of regulations established in UNCLOS. Further, the relevant 
countries also recognize that the [UN’s] Continental Shelf Commission has decision-making 
authority [sic] toward their stances. The current influence of our country in Arctic legal af-
fairs is, for the most part, not large and is still stuck in the corner of scientific research. But 
proceeding from our country’s strategic rights and interests, our country can, on the basis 
of issues pertaining to the extension of continental shelves and the harmonization of our 
relevant stances toward outer continental shelves, pay close attention at the highest levels 
to the applications [to the Continental Shelf Commission] of Arctic countries for their 
continental shelves. [We can] emphasize the international position of the Arctic region’s 
seabed areas and high seas, expand the space of the Arctic as global public territory, and 
leave behind space for the future search for rights and interests in the Arctic.76
Mei and Wang doubt very much the utility of the Antarctic model, and they cite, in or-
der to dispute, Chinese scholars who think otherwise. Any analogy between the Antarctic 
and the Arctic in international terms is, they argue, inappropriate: 
First, the isolation of Antarctica determined that Antarctic international isolation would 
not exert substantial influence on the strategic rights and interests of each state involved. 
The Arctic, however, is quite different. The internationalization of the Arctic will certainly 
be hugely influential on the strategic rights and interests of the Arctic states.* Russia and 
Canada especially will not tolerate the internationalization of the Arctic. 
Second, taking note of the background that led to the “Antarctic Treaty,” it is not difficult 
to see that although some countries discovered mainland Antarctica very early on, they 
were still unable to carry out effective opening up of mainland Antarctica due to their 
levels of technological development at the time. That is to say, none of these countries ob-
tained substantial rights and interests in Antarctica, and this made the internationalization 
of Antarctica become a possibility. Let us ask: If the United States, England, France, and 
others had carried out large-scale opening up of Antarctica at the time, could Antarctica 
* Beiji zhoubian guojia here refers, I think, to the A8 and not just the five Arctic littoral states.—Trans. 
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still have been internationalized? Look again at the Arctic region, where Russia, the United 
States, Canada, and other powerful maritime states struck first and gained the upper hand, 
getting an early start in research on topics relating to the Arctic (including research on 
the legal position of the Arctic and research on Arctic natural science). They have already 
realized, or in the not-too-distant future will realize, their rights and interests in the Arctic 
region. Against this background, will they forsake these rights and interests and make 
concessions? 
Third, the positions of the circum-Arctic states in the Arctic are, in reality, unequal. For 
example, Russia has an absolute advantage in the numbers of ice-breaking vessels, and 
from Russia’s “flag-planting incident” can be seen the overbearing manner of this big 
northern lunk. The minority circum-Arctic countries have difficulties [even] in reach-
ing common understandings [heyi], to say nothing of drawing up an international Arctic 
treaty.77 
Liu and Yang give four reasons for their similar pessimism. First, Antarctica is a conti-
nent and the only piece of land in the world without a sovereign, whereas in the Arctic 
there are several states with territorial sovereignty, exclusive economic zones, and 
continental shelves; second, article 234 of UNCLOS already addresses ice-covered sea 
areas, and UNCLOS is widely applied in the Arctic region; third, many bilateral and 
multilateral agreements pertaining to the Arctic have already been concluded under the 
influence of UNCLOS, including AEPS; and fourth, the Antarctic is a nonmilitarized 
region, whereas nuclear weapons are present in the Arctic, the most militarized region in 
the world.78 
It is worth noting that reservations by individual Chinese analysts about the analogical 
applicability of the Antarctic Treaty to current Arctic affairs dovetail with U.S. foreign 
policy on the issue: “The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficient-
ly from those of the Antarctic region such that an ‘Arctic Treaty’ of broad scope—along 
the lines of the Antarctic Treaty—is not appropriate or necessary.”79 
The Arctic in China’s Popular Media 
Coverage of Arctic issues is not limited to academic venues in China, and the subject is 
gradually attracting attention in China’s mass media. A significant amount of the public-
media commentary and reporting on military affairs in recent years has been by the elo-
quent and telegenic Shao Yongling, a female tutor to doctoral students and holder of the 
military rank of senior colonel at China’s Second Artillery Academy. Shao has regularly 
appeared in programs on CCTV 7, a television channel in China’s state-controlled media 
empire, and is currently a distinguished guest speaker on the weekend program Around 
the World’s Military Affairs in Sixty Minutes. Shao published a popular book in March 
2010 on the relationship between naval might and the rise of great powers, and in it is a 
chapter entitled “Whose Arctic Is It?”80 
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In Dili jiaoyu (Geographical Education), a periodical largely for middle-school educators, 
a high school teacher in Jiangsu Province wrote in 2009 on global warming and its influ-
ence on the hydrology and biology of the Arctic, in an article that turned to an analysis 
of its global social and economic impacts.81
The Finnish scholar Linda Jakobson’s landmark 2010 study of China’s interests in the 
Arctic and its preparations for an ice-free Arctic region has led to some commentary and 
discussion in popular Chinese media, as in the 2 March 2010 edition of Fazhi wanbao, 
which presented a straightforward account of Jakobson’s observations and conclusions.82 
But another article, published on 6 March, was critical of Jakobson’s study, character-
izing it as speculative in nature and alleging that it failed to provide evidence for its 
contentions.83 
The November 2010 issue of Dangdai haijun contains four articles on the Arctic—an 
overview of international angling for territorial position in the Arctic and three fulmina-
tions against, respectively, Russia for its flag-planting “incident” on the bottom of the 
Arctic Sea, the United States for playing the environmental card as a ploy for achieving 
hegemony over the Arctic, and Canada for regarding the Arctic as its “backyard.”84 
The Chinese Government Speaks—a Little
Although China’s Arctic policy is currently being debated and is not yet fully formulated, 
some of its contours are emerging fairly clearly. First and foremost, it is already obvious 
that China views the Arctic as international territory and not the private property or 
exclusive preserve of the A5 or A8. Beyond that, the Chinese government seems, in open 
speeches and publications at least, to be making rather optimistic noises and gestures as 
to future amicable resolution of present Arctic disputes. 
In 2009 Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, gave an address on 
the Chinese government’s perspectives at an Arctic forum in Norway’s Svalbard Archi-
pelago. He started out by depicting the Arctic as a global concern: “The Arctic occupies 
a unique position for all of us as humankind who live on the blue planet. The changing 
natural environment in the Arctic is enormously influential toward the existence and 
environment of all humankind. The Arctic is a sensitive region in global climate change. 
The entire planet in turn reacts to natural changes in the Arctic, especially the climate of 
the northern hemisphere.”85
From here Hu segued into a characterization of China as a country in the northern 
hemisphere and therefore a rightful participant in Arctic affairs: 
China is a northern hemisphere country, and changes in the cold air activity of the Arctic 
region and the atmospheric circulation of high-latitude climes have direct influences on 
China’s weather and climate and obvious effects on China’s ecological and environmental 
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systems and its agricultural production and other social and economic activities. The 
melting of Arctic ice quickly raises global sea levels and influences the economic and social 
development of China’s eastern coastal regions. Arctic matters do, therefore, have multiple 
bearings on China’s natural environment, economy, and society. They influence the 
sustainability of China’s development. The government of China is, therefore, greatly con-
cerned about them. China needs to understand more about climate change in the Arctic 
and more about the influence of this type of change on China. (p. 54) 
Hu then went on to describe China’s recent scientific activities in the Arctic—their 
beginning in the mid-1990s, China’s formal joining of the International Arctic Science 
Committee in 1996, and three combined Arctic Ocean investigations, in 1999, 2003, and 
2008. In 2004, he noted, China established the Arctic Yellow River Station in the Arctic 
(in fact, on Spitsbergen Island) for scientific research into climate change and ecological 
and maritime subjects. That China has already become a significant player in the Arctic 
game was his strong implication.
Having China’s own current contentious issues of exclusive economic zones and con-
tinental shelves in mind, Hu was careful to indicate that China would show respect for 
these concerns in the Arctic:
China takes note of the exclusive economic zones and outer continental shelves of relevant 
countries in the Arctic region, especially since the extended continental shelves have yet to 
be designated. China considers that the undetermined nature of the legal position of the 
maritime areas of the Arctic region might influence the further development of coopera-
tion in the Arctic and hopes that relevant countries will, through consultation and on the 
basis of international law and scientific data, come to an early resolution of relevant issues. 
(p. 55)
Hu’s comments to this point amount to little more than standard diplomatic bureaucrat-
ese, but now he adds a broad hint that Arctic countries should not attempt to lock up for 
themselves the natural resource wealth of the Arctic: 
While determining the demarcations of extended continental shelves, the countries of the 
Arctic region should, in addition to appropriately handling relations among themselves, 
give full and careful consideration to the relationship between extended continental 
shelves and international seabed areas which are the shared inherited wealth of all human-
kind. Arctic countries should protect the balance between the interests of states with shore-
lines on the Arctic Ocean and the shared interests of the international community. (p. 55) 
Nonetheless, Hu recognizes the Arctic issue as mainly a regional issue, apparently 
contradicting Guo Peiqing’s earlier insistence in 2008 that “circumpolar nations have to 
understand that Arctic affairs are not only regional issues but also international ones.”86 
Hu does observe, however, that China prefers a cooperative international approach to 
the Arctic whenever possible: 
30 china maritime studies
The Arctic issue is mainly a regional issue, but it also involves climate change, shipping, 
and other trans-regional issues that require strengthened cooperation at regional and 
international levels. China is very happy to observe that over the past 20 years, Arctic 
cooperation has continually deepened, broadened, and is becoming more mechanized 
with each passing day. Cooperation is now the mainstream of Arctic affairs, and China 
respects the sovereignty and jurisdictional authority enjoyed by states in the Arctic region 
in accordance with international law. China is willing to strengthen mutually beneficial 
cooperation with all parties involved in relevant Arctic issues and work diligently for the 
peace, stability, and sustainable development of the Arctic region.87 
It is noteworthy that Hu did not comment on the issue of Canadian sovereignty over 
the Northwest Passage. Frédéric Lasserre observes that Beijing has officially remained 
silent regarding Canada’s position that the passage is internal Canadian waters: “China 
has not publicly stated its position concerning the status of the Northwest Passage, but it 
would certainly be interested in securing a mechanism that could provide for a safe and 
fast passage to its energy-hungry markets. That does not mean it will seek to undermine 
Canada’s stance on sovereignty over the Northwest Passage; Beijing has remained neutral 
on the sovereignty issue.”88
In a 2010 article, Jia Yu, of the State Oceanic Administration (Guojia Haiyangju), gives a 
fairly detailed historical overview of Arctic territorial issues all the way back to the Tzar 
Alexander I’s declaration of sovereignty over parts of North America in 1821.89 He even 
briefly covers the outstanding issue between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island. 
His purpose in all of this, never explicitly stated, seems to be to show that many issues 
pertaining to territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves have 
been debated and resolved in the past and that remaining issues will likely be resolved 
in the future: “Of the disputes over maritime boundaries in the Arctic region, some have 
been successfully resolved; some are still being debated, and some have been alleviated 
through joint development, fishery agreements, and other such ways.”90 
Jia covers the 1957 agreement on the maritime boundary between Norway and the 
Soviet Union in the Varangerfjorden (the coastal region of the land boundary between 
Norway and the Soviet Union) in the Barents Sea; the agreement on the continental 
shelf boundary between Canada and Greenland in 1981 and 1982; the 1990 treaty 
between the United States and the Soviet Union on the maritime boundary between the 
Chukchi Sea (north of the Bering Sea) and the Bering Sea; the 1993 decision of the ICJ 
regarding the designation of the continental shelf and fishery area boundaries between 
Norway and Denmark and the subsequent Danish-Norwegian treaty in 1995; and the 
agreement between Norway and Russia in 2007 on the continental shelf. He also covers 
the outstanding dispute between Canada and the United States over the Beaufort Sea 
maritime boundary. (At stake in this dispute are over six thousand square nautical miles 
of sea area above rich oil and natural-gas resources.) He concludes with the observation 
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that there remain outstanding disputes between Iceland and Denmark over maritime 
boundaries between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands and between Norway’s Svalbard 
Islands and Greenland.91 
Next Jia covers the thorny issue of outer continental shelves extending beyond two 
hundred nautical miles and looks at current applications by Norway, Russia, Canada, 
and Denmark to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to secure 
these extensions for themselves. He points out that the United States, which has yet to 
accede to UNCLOS, has “criticized” these applications.92 He then drops a broad and sub-
tly optimistic hint that the Svalbard Treaty (which China joined in 1925) and UNCLOS 
will provide precedents and momentum for the eventual resolution of other current or 
incipient Arctic issues: 
The main body of the Arctic region is the Arctic Ocean. Intimately related to this special 
geographical feature [is the fact that] dispositions of territorial sovereignty in the Arctic 
region have gone through several previous changes and have long since been relegated to 
the dust. UNCLOS affirmed Norway’s territorial sovereignty over Svalbard Islands, thereby 
resolving the disposition of sovereignty over the Svalbard Islands as well as guaranteeing 
their relative long-term stability. Even so, Norway’s “full and complete sovereignty” over 
the Svalbard Islands is restrained by the vessels and citizens of each signatory state in the 
Svalbard Islands and by their fishing and hunting rights in internal waters. This causes 
Norway’s sovereignty over the Svalbard Islands to differ to some extent from the para-
mount completeness of territorial sovereignty enjoyed by states in traditional international 
law. Articles of the Svalbard Treaty are now facing issues of integration with the modern 
legal system established by UNCLOS. At present only Canada and Denmark are standing 
their ground over Hans Island. At this same time, especially since the 1980s of the twen-
tieth century, relevant countries have concluded and signed maritime boundary treaties 
and have resolved, or are in the process of resolving, issues pertaining to the boundaries of 
exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.93 
Jia here quite likely means to suggest or hint that the Svalbard Treaty could be used as 
a model, precedent, or analogue for defining Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest 
Passage. This idea has been noted and dismissed as impossible in an article published in 
Canada.94 
Jia next concludes his article with two paragraphs setting out his opinion (and very 
likely the Chinese government’s as well) that the Arctic, beyond the extended continental 
shelves of the A5, belongs to the world: 
One of the obvious peculiarities of the disputes over sea area boundary delimitation in 
the Arctic region is the inclusion among them of issues pertaining to continental shelves 
beyond two hundred nautical miles. This forms unique “boundary limits” between the 
national jurisdictional sea areas of littoral states on the one hand and international seabed 
regions (“regions”) on the other. According to UNCLOS, “regions” and their resources 
beyond the limits of the outer continental shelves of littoral states are the commonly 
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inherited wealth of humankind, and the International Seabed Authority exercises, on 
behalf of all humankind, the rights to the “regions” and their resources. The two-hundred-
nautical-mile outer continental shelves of littoral states on the one hand and the “regions” 
on the other are a zero-sum game—the tendency of excessively extending the continental 
shelves of littoral states is certainly to shrink the scope of the “regions,” thereby influenc-
ing the rights and interests of all humankind. Whether and how much of the seabed of 
the Arctic Ocean belongs to the continental shelves of littoral states [are questions that] 
await the deliberations and recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf in response to Russian and Norwegian boundary submissions and future 
boundary limitation cases brought by other circum-Arctic countries. 
The “Antarctic Treaty” system froze the claims of relevant countries to territorial sover-
eignty over mainland Antarctica and guaranteed the “deep slumber” of the continent of 
Antarctica for many decades. Could a more concrete treaty for the Arctic also be formulat-
ed, one which would cause the opening up and exploitation of the Arctic region to benefit 
all humankind? Whether this kind of treaty can be produced or not, there is one point 
that needs to be clear and definite: The Arctic Ocean is not the backyard of any country or 
group of countries and is not the “private property” of the Arctic Ocean littoral states. As 
with Earth’s other oceans, under the framework of international law, every country in the 
world has an equal right to exploit the Arctic Ocean.95
Caution—for the Time Being 
American policy makers should be aware that China’s recent interest in Arctic affairs 
is not an evanescent fancy or a passing political fad but a serious, new, incipient policy 
direction. China is taking concrete diplomatic steps to ensure that it becomes a player 
in the Arctic game and eventually will have what it regards as its fair share of access 
to Arctic resources and sea routes. China has already committed substantial human, 
institutional, and naval resources to its Arctic interests and will continue to do so, likely 
at an accelerated rate, in the future. The Polar Research Institute of China (Zhongguo 
Jidi Yanjiu Zhongxin), with a staff of 124 people headquartered in Shanghai, supervises 
three Chinese research stations in the Antarctic and one in the Arctic. It also manages 
the Chinese icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon), a light, Ukraine-built, nonnuclear vessel 
with a displacement of twenty-one thousand tons, used in both Arctic and Antarctic 
scientific expeditions.96 Xuelong, the largest conventionally powered icebreaker in the 
world, reached eighty-eight degrees north latitude in August 2010, and its helicopter 
took Chinese Arctic researchers to the North Pole on 20 August 2010, a Chinese first. 
The Arctic and Antarctic Administration (Guojia Haiyangju Jidi Kaocha Bangongshi), 
under the State Oceanic Administration, also manages Chinese scientific research activ-
ity in the Arctic.97 China currently plans to build its own smaller (eight thousand tons 
displacement) sister icebreaker to Xuelong, at a cost of U.S.$300 million, and to have it 
operational by 2013. “Between the two ships,” the New York Times observed in May 2010, 
“China will have larger and more modern icebreakers than either the United States or 
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Canada.”98 Russia, for its part, has over a dozen heavy icebreakers, seven of them nuclear 
powered. 
The United States should, of course, make heavy icebreakers a national defense priority. 
Many Americans would be shocked to learn that both of their country’s heavy icebreak-
ers designed for use in the thickest ice are decrepit, decades-old vessels and are at this 
writing broken down or otherwise unavailable. One, Polar Star, is in dry dock in Seattle 
for an overhaul and will not be operational again until 2013. The other, Polar Sea, is out 
of service and, at this writing, will not be seaworthy again until sometime in 2011. (Polar 
Sea was commissioned in 1978 with a projected thirty-year service life; an overhaul in 
2006 extended its service life to 2014.)99 There is a third icebreaker, USCGC Healy, but 
it is not designed for heavy ice. The New York Times bemoaned the resultant state of 
American Arctic defenses on 25 June 2010 in stark terms: 
Even as the long-term trend in the Arctic is toward less sea ice in summers, for decades to 
come—and routinely in other seasons—any nation with interests in the far north will need 
to be able to navigate in heavy ice. 
Until Congress and the White House come up with a plan to round up about $1.5 billion 
to keep the Polar Sea and Polar Star running, and another $1 billion or so to build replace-
ments, the United States is an Arctic nation without that capacity.100
How can the U.S. Coast Guard guard the Arctic coasts of the United States without the 
required vessels? Icebreakers are not Cold War relics but essential components of Arctic 
security. The need to repair and make more of them is pressing and real, now, and it will 
be in the future.
For its part, China is working discreetly and energetically to foster good relations with 
Arctic states. Beijing is currently quite annoyed at Norway for awarding Chinese dis-
sident Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize on 8 October 2010 and is making noises about 
damage to Sino-Norwegian relations. Already China has canceled some official contacts 
between the two countries. But given China’s heavy reliance on Norway in its maneu-
vering for advantage in the Arctic region, it is quite unlikely that any damage will be 
substantial or enduring. Russia Today reported on 5 October 2010 that the two states 
very much need each other: 
Back in August this year, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre praised China’s 
cooperation in the Arctic and said it should go farther in the future. Speaking at the 
China Institute of International Studies Forum in Beijing, he said that Oslo had observed 
“China’s technological interest and capability in the Arctic.”
“We would like to see how Norwegian and Chinese research groups on the environment 
come together in highly complementary areas of interest and go deeper, in areas rang-
ing from natural science to geopolitics,” he said, cited Beijing Review. “It is important for 
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Norway to engage with China in dialogue about all issues relevant in the region,” Støre 
added.101 
China is also cultivating close relationships with Iceland: 
Meanwhile, Beijing is also actively strengthening ties with another player in the region—
Iceland. The area of particular interest for China is new sea routes which are opening 
due to ice melting. Citing Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson[’s] interview with 
Norwegian broadcaster NRK, Barents Observer wrote that over the past two years relations 
between Iceland and China have picked up pace. 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, when the banks collapsed in Iceland, “we faced a situ-
ation, where there was no positive helping hand coming either from Europe or the United 
States, and I and the government decided to approach the government of China . . . to 
see if China could show some friendship in these times of difficulties,” Grímsson said. He 
added that the bilateral talks between the leaderships of the two countries indicated that 
China is keen “to cooperate with Iceland and the other countries in the Arctic region on 
what is happening in the Arctic and the northern regions and also of what are the implica-
tions of the northern sea routes opening up over the next few decades,” the president is 
quoted as telling NRK.102 
“China can be expected to seek a role in determining the political framework and legal 
foundation for future Arctic activities,” Linda Jakobson noted in early 2010.103 It seems 
that China respects, in principle, the UN’s continental shelf system. But China very 
much wants a voice in Arctic affairs, and it will likely seek to influence, or at least com-
ment emphatically upon, the decision-making processes and deliberations of the UN’s 
Continental Shelf Commission. While there is likely little, as a practical matter, that 
China could do to influence the decisions of the commission, in the future China will 
monitor very closely the extended-continental-shelf claims of A5 countries, will likely 
express its opinions about them, and may even dispute some of them. Some Chinese 
academics see the stakes for China in all of this as huge: “Guo [Peiqing] has estimated 
that about 88 percent of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean would be under the control of 
the Arctic littoral states if the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf were 
to approve all the existing or expected claims to the Arctic Ocean continental shelf.”104 
A Russo-Chinese entente concerning Arctic affairs seems unlikely. China is particularly 
wary of Russia’s designs and intentions in the Arctic, and the feeling would seem to be 
mutual.105 In fact, China seems to be more at odds with Russia over Arctic affairs than 
with any other A5 or A8 state. There could, however, be cooperation among East Asian 
states regarding the Arctic issue.106 
The Svalbard Treaty affirms “the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the 
Archipelago of Spitsbergen” but qualifies this sovereignty to some extent by stipulating 
the rights of the nationals of all signatory states to “equal liberty of access and entry for 
any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords, and ports” of the islands. The treaty 
the dragon eyes the top of the world 35
further restricts Norway from militarizing the archipelago.107 It was on the basis of the 
provisions of this treaty that China managed in 2004 to establish a physical presence in 
the Arctic by constructing its Arctic Yellow River Station (Huanghe Zhan) in the Sval-
bard Archipelago/Spitsbergen (in the Barents Sea, well inside the Arctic Circle), a facility 
for oceanic and climatological research. China became the eighth state to establish re-
search facilities there. Some (but certainly not all) Chinese academics and governmental 
officials who comment on Arctic affairs have indirectly and tentatively floated (or at least 
broadly hinted at) the possibility of using the Svalbard Treaty as a model or precedent 
for resolving Canada’s claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage as internal Ca-
nadian waters. Their suggestion seems more or less to be that Canada might be allowed 
Svalbard-like “full and absolute sovereignty” over the passage but with the proviso that 
international shipping be allowed passage through it with something like “equal liberty 
of access and entry for any reason or object whatever.” But this of course would be quite 
unpalatable to Canada, and it seems naive to assume or hope that the Canadian govern-
ment and public would ever accept it.
The United States should neither underestimate China’s burgeoning interests in the 
Arctic region nor allow itself to be outdone by China. The Chinese have become acute 
observers of the region. According Dr. Robert Huebert, an internationally renowned 
Canadian expert on the Arctic at the University of Calgary, China has shown itself to be 
a quick study in Arctic affairs and has been doing a lot of very good homework on the 
region.108 The government of the United States should pay close attention to China’s 
engagement in Arctic affairs and consider its possible security implications, especially 
since the U.S. Navy in late 2009 observed that increasing economic and scientific activi-
ties in the Arctic are “potential sources of competition and conflict for access and natural 
resources.”109 
The United States and its allies should be prepared for possible Chinese submarine 
incursions into the Arctic. A study published in Beijing in 2002 by Military Science  
applies Sunzi to submarine warfare and points out the value of the submarine in high-
tech intelligence gathering and surveillance: “In the modern technology and information 
age, the marvelous way [dao] of employing spies in waging submarine warfare is indeed 
the application of high new technology.”110 China has placed strong new emphasis on 
strengthening and updating its submarine fleet, and its submarines have recently stalked 
American naval vessels. Given this trend and also the brazen violation of Japanese ter-
ritorial waters by a Chinese submarine in 2004, it should not be too surprising in the 
future to find or detect one or more Chinese submarines lurking in the cold and murky 
depths of the Arctic, perhaps even in the territorial Arctic waters of the United States or 
Canada.111 In Cold War history there is much precedent for Soviet and American peace-
time submarine operations and maneuvers in the Arctic.112 
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It is, however, also important not to overestimate the importance of the Arctic in most 
publicly available Chinese naval strategic thinking. Two important books by major Chi-
nese naval strategists published in 2010 discuss little if anything substantive regarding 
Chinese interests in the Arctic, but they cover the Indian Ocean quite extensively.113 One 
recent book on Chinese seapower does, however, have the insight and foresight to devote 
significant coverage to Arctic and Antarctic affairs.114 
The United States should accede to UNCLOS. This would be difficult currently, because 
a small but obstreperous group of senators is holding up accession, a regrettable and un-
fortunate situation since the United States can ill afford to be marginalized or hampered 
and hobbled in Arctic affairs while other A5 states busily prepare extended-continental-
shelf territorial claims. These senators should rethink their positions in light of China’s 
recent and developing engagement in Arctic affairs and note that at least two Chinese 
commentators have concluded that continual American nonaccession will be detrimen-
tal to U.S. interests.115 
As well, an American naval analyst has recently observed that “the failure of the United 
States to accede to UNCLOS gives China unchallenged diplomatic space to attempt to 
shape law of the sea in its favor.”116 
Ironically, the United States is currently preparing its own extended-continental-shelf 
claims in the Arctic even though it is not party to UNCLOS, which provides the mecha-
nism for submitting such claims. American legal rationale and liabilities pertaining to this 
are published on the Extended Continental Shelf Project website of the U.S. government: 
The United States is the only Arctic country, and indeed one of the few countries in 
the world, that has not yet ratified the LOS Convention. A non-party country has the 
same rights in its extended continental shelf as a country that has ratified the Conven-
tion, but without ratifying, the U.S. cannot submit its scientific findings to the CLCS, 
which means the U.S. will not have the opportunity to receive their recommendations 
and set ECS [extended continental shelf] limits based on them. There is an [sic] benefit 
to considering these recommendations: according to the LOS Convention, if a coastal 
country establishes its ECS limits “on the basis of” CLCS recommendations, those limits 
are “final and binding.”117
Accession to UNCLOS is the common recommendation of both the former George W. 
Bush and current Barack Obama administrations and is supported by a strong alliance 
of American military, environmental, shipping, energy, and other interests. In its recently 
issued “U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap,” the U.S. Navy itself urges UNCLOS accession.118 No-
where is the rationale for accession better spelled out than in the most recent statement 
of American Arctic policy, issued during the final days of the Bush administration: 
The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the 
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Arctic. Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the 
maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over 
extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain. Accession 
will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the 
United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated 
and interpreted.119
As for Beijing, it is somewhat difficult to read or predict all of its intentions and policy 
designs regarding the Arctic. Some observers view China’s rapidly developing interest 
in the Arctic with concern and even alarm, while others are less certain that Chinese 
engagement in Arctic affairs has ominous implications. Lasserre, for instance, takes a 
relatively benign view of China’s growing wealth and power in general and of its Arctic 
interests in particular.120 He even sees cooperation with China and engagement of the 
country within the Arctic Council as a possible way to advance Canadian interests in 
the Arctic.121 It might also be a means to counter American intransigence regarding the 
Northwest Passage: “The Canadian government, confronted with the Americans’ refusal 
to recognize its claim of sovereignty over the waters of the Northwest Passage, could en-
gage China as well as other countries in discussing the need to implement tight shipping 
rules in the Arctic.”122 He also regards China’s Arctic interests as more an opportunity 
than a danger for Canada;123 Jakobson takes the same view with regard to “the Nordic 
countries that otherwise struggle to be noticed by the rising great power that is preoccu-
pied by global challenges.”124 
China has stated that it “takes note” of the EEZs and outer continental shelves of A5 
countries, but these statements are of course somewhat qualified and ambiguous; China 
has also indicated its hopes that the A5 states will balance their own economic inter-
ests with those of the international community (meaning primarily China). But even 
if these statements are taken at face value, they are still largely unclear, because they do 
not preclude the possibility of Beijing’s aversion to the future submission of extended-
continental-shelf claims by the five Arctic littoral states. 
But expressing displeasure at A5 extended-continental-shelf claims in the Arctic could 
be a delicate and difficult matter for Beijing in view of its own such claims in the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea.125 While the South China Sea is a core interest to 
China and the Arctic is not, Beijing nonetheless knows it is faced with a thorny diplo-
matic quandary in the latter and is currently thinking through the tortuous diplomatic 
contortions and inconsistent, selective logic that its engagement in Arctic affairs may 
entail in the future. China seems to apply very different approaches to territoriality in 
the South China Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Even though “only a few of the South China 
Sea’s islands qualify under UNCLOS for more than a mere 12–nautical mile territorial 
sea” and “only a small handful of all the islands in the South China Sea qualify for an 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf,” China has now “essentially claimed the 
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South China Sea as its own,” based largely on its own domestically legislated claims and 
on self-perceived strategic imperatives.126 China would, however, almost certainly find 
distasteful A5 states doing essentially the same things in the Arctic region. Thus, Beijing 
finds itself on the horns of a dilemma in terms of the consistency of its South China Sea 
policy and its incipient Arctic policy, and Washington seems to have clued in on this. 
Since “international law prevents a state from claiming legal rights if it objects to the 
same type of claims by other states,” it may well be that Washington is subtly tolerat-
ing or even encouraging greater Chinese enthusiasm for the commons approach to the 
Arctic, if only to lessen China’s potentially more assertive approaches to maritime claims 
in its own region.127 
The U.S. Navy itself has acknowledged that “while the Arctic is not unfamiliar to the 
Navy, expanded capabilities and capacity may be required for the Navy to increase its 
engagement in this region.”128 The American navy is committed to “strengthen[ing] 
institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations”;129 it has “broad and funda-
mental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either 
independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests”;130 finally, 
it wants to “promote a safe, stable, and secure Arctic region by strengthening existing 
and fostering new cooperative relationships.”131 
Prudence and realism dictate that foreign policy plan and hope for the best but prepare 
for the worst. China is quite aware that its “size and rise to power status evoke jitters,” 
and according to Linda Jakobson, Beijing has decided, for the time being at least, to 
“advocate cautious Arctic policies for fear of causing alarm and provoking countermea-
sures among the Arctic states.”132 But this reticence and restraint on China’s part will not 
likely last indefinitely. China is very heavily dependent on international shipping (energy 
imports and finished goods exports) for its economic, social, and political stability;133 if 
and when the Arctic proves to be truly valuable for its natural resources and sea routes, 
Beijing will likely become much more assertive. The United States should be prepared 
for the possibility that Beijing could someday conclude that developments or situations 
in the Arctic threaten China’s economic prosperity, and thus Chinese social stability and 
ultimately the political power of the Communist Party of China. At a minimum it is in 
the interest of the United States and the other A5 NATO democracies to maintain defen-
sive capabilities for safeguarding the security of the Arctic region. 
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 Abbreviations and Definitions
A  A5 Arctic Five (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United 
  States)
 A8 Arctic Five plus Finland, Iceland, and Sweden
 AEPS Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
 AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
C CAA Canadian Arctic Archipelago
 CAFF Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
 CCTV China Central Television
 CLC International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
 CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
 CPC Communist Party of China
E EEZ exclusive economic zone
 EPPR energy prevention, preparedness, and response
I ICJ International Court of Justice
L  LNG  liquefied natural gas
 LOS law of the sea
M  MARPOL  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
  
P  PAME  Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
S SWOT strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
U UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Ships
 Chinese Glossary
B  Baguo Lianjun  八国联军
 Beiji zhoubian guojia  北极周边国家
 biduan  弊端
C chashou  插手
D dao  道
G gongtu  公土
 Guojia Haiyangju   国家海洋局
  Guojia Haiyangju Jidi  
 Kaocha Bangongshi    国家海洋局极地考察办公室
H  heyi   合意
  Huanghe Zhan   黄河站
 huayu quan  话语权 
J Jidi baguo lianmeng   极地八国联盟
L linian  理念
T tongbing  通病
X Xuelong   雪龙
Z zhengqu zhanlue    争取战略
 Zhongguo Jidi Yanjiu  
 Zhongxin     中国极地研究中心
 zhuquan  主权
 zhuquan quanli   主权权利
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